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RESEARCH & DEBATE

THE NEW YOUNG TURKS

Commander Benjamin Armstrong, U.S. Navy

From the sixth floor of the University of Chicago Gleacher Center you can look
down the river and into the reflected prism of the bustling city’s concrete, steel,
and glass. In the opposite direction you look out across Lake Michigan where the
blue and grey come together at a far horizon. These remarkable vistas welcomed
the second annual Defense Entrepreneurs Forum (DEF) in October 2014. Over
one hundred and fifty military personnel, defense-industry professionals, and
innovation experts came together for three days to discuss the issues and critical
questions faced by American defense in the twenty-first century.
DEF was the brainchild of a small group of relatively junior officers. Coming
out of more than a decade of war, many served with a high level of responsibility
that is uncommon for young men and women. They encountered not just the
issues of life and death that combat brings but also the demands of humanitarian work for entire towns, nation-building responsibilities in large cities, and the
need to come up with creative solutions to the problems they faced. Frequently
this included working with limited resources or for an unresponsive, stagnant
bureaucracy. They knew, with challenges looming in the coming decades, that
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of directors looked to expand the circle of people talking about new ways of addressing the defense world. They aimed to support those who were being constructively critical of military organizations, particularly those inside the system.2
As a naval officer by profession and military helicopter pilot by trade, I was
drawn to these ideas. As a historian by education, I also knew that the processes
they were exploring and the grand narrative they looked to build were not quite
as new and disruptive as some believed. Context, as is said, is king.
Twice I’ve been asked to serve as a speaker at the annual DEF conference in
Chicago, most recently as the opening keynote. My historical talks have looked
to illuminate some of the recurring questions that come along with defense innovation and adaptation.3 But as I have interacted and collaborated with these
inspired defense professionals, I have also come to realize that there is a great
deal of history in the existence of this organization, despite its clearly twentyfirst-century roots.
A COMMENDABLE LITTLE INSTITUTION
Almost two hundred years ago during the presidency of Andrew Jackson, a period emerged in U.S. naval history that some historians have termed an age of
naval enlightenment. The first two decades after the U.S. Navy’s refounding in
1798 were a busy time for naval officers, who saw four wars: the Quasi-War with
France, First Barbary War, War of 1812, and Second Barbary War. The following
Jackson years brought a period of relative peace for the service, opening up a
period of reflection and professionalization.4
With less combat and fewer deployments, officers began considering the
details of their service more closely. The officers assigned to the Brooklyn Navy
Yard took inspiration from the lyceum movement that had spread across Europe.
In 1833 they established the U.S. Naval Lyceum in a small building on the base.
Dominated by junior officers, the group wrote in its constitution: “We, the Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, in order to promote the diffusion of useful
knowledge,—to foster a spirit of harmony and a community of interest in the
service, and to cement the links which unite us as professional brethren, have
formed ourselves into a Society, to be denominated ‘The United States Naval
Lyceum.’”5
Their effort was twofold. First, they looked to establish a museum of artifacts,
art, and curiosities that naval officers collected from their deployments across the
seven seas. Second, they established the Naval Magazine to discuss the pressing
issues of the day.
For two years the Naval Magazine was at the forefront of naval professionalism and criticism. Subjects for discussion included the military promotion system and rank structure, the introduction of new technology like steam power,
and strategic and geopolitical subjects. Unfortunately, the maintenance of the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/10
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museum and building that housed the lyceum appears to have taken up a majority of the funds, and the magazine ceased publication in 1837. But the ideals of
innovation and reform were alive and well, as one of the magazine’s pseudonymous authors wrote: “The spirit of the times and the necessities of the navy loudly
declare that change is requisite. We cannot remain as we are.”6
The lyceum lived on well beyond the last issue of the magazine, continuing to
host lectures and talks on the vital naval subjects of the day. The museum’s collection grew into an important repository. The New York Times described it as
“a commendable little institution in every sense.”7 The members who established
the organization as junior officers rose through the ranks and became important
naval leaders of the Mexican-American War and the Civil War. They commanded
America’s first steam-powered warships and led the Navy’s growing responsibilities on the global stage. The lyceum established a vital intellectual foundation for
military officers who looked to improve their service.
THE DECADE OF NEGLECT
Following the end of the American Civil War the United States continued a pattern that has been displayed throughout its history by dramatically cutting back
on defense spending. The War between the States, reconstructing the nation in
its wake, and the promise of continued expansion westward guided the American
populace to a continental, internal focus that led to cuts in the Navy’s size and
capabilities. Many naval officers saw it as a decade of neglect.
In October 1873 fifteen of these officers came together on the grounds of the
U.S. Naval Academy. Senior and junior commissioned naval officers, as well as
warrant officers and Marines, they began as a discussion group to debate naval
affairs and national and international issues. They named their society the United
States Naval Institute. Many of the early meetings included discussing and commenting on papers that were prepared and presented by the members. They decided to publish their own journal, containing the best of the papers and some of
the commentary. In December 1874 the journal was first published as the Papers
and Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute and is now known today as
Proceedings magazine.8
Early members of the institute included officers who would have enormous
impacts on the Navy and Marine Corps, and even the nation at large. Stephen
Luce, one of the first officers to present a paper, is best known as the greatest
advocate for, and founding President of, the U.S. Naval War College. His virtual invention of American professional military education had an impact on
strategic thought and military and naval affairs that rippled across generations.
Another early member was Alfred Thayer Mahan, known to most students of
military history for his strategic writing and his famous book The Influence of Sea
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Power upon History. He was one of the institute’s earliest presidents. He began his
publishing career with his essay on naval education in the pages of Proceedings.
From Civil War officers like Admiral David Dixon Porter to the future SpanishAmerican War leaders like W. T. Sampson and George Dewey, the organization
grew rapidly. The articles published in Proceedings questioned the status quo and
raised American knowledge of naval affairs as the country came out of its Manifest Destiny period and returned its attention to the larger world.9
The U.S. Naval Institute and Proceedings began primarily as a place for junior
and midlevel officers to express their ideas and advocate for reform. Over time
they continued that tradition but also became a place for thought leaders, from
senior admirals to established academics, to debate the issues with upstart junior
officers and military critics who looked to move in new directions. The professional society officially adopted the mission “to provide an independent forum
for those who dare to read, think, speak, and write in order to advance the professional, literary, and scientific understanding of sea power and other issues critical
to national defense.”10
REGENERATING SERVICE INTELLECTS
Forty years after the officers met in Annapolis another group gathered in discussion in Hampshire, England. These Royal Navy officers saw the approach of the
Great War and feared that their service was unprepared. They met, as Reginald
Plunkett said, to develop “some means of regenerating Service intellects before
Armageddon.”11 These British sailors were focused on their own officer corps,
which they believed needed a greater understanding of naval affairs and war as
the United Kingdom approached the looming conflict.
Inspired by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and the noted civilian strategist
Sir Julian Corbett, they founded what was originally thought of as a correspondence society. The purpose was to bring junior officers together in discussions
for their own self-improvement. In 1913 they began publication of a journal
titled the Naval Review. There was significant official resistance from the newly
established Naval War Staff, and during World War I the Admiralty ordered the
Naval Review to cease publication. However, W. H. Henderson, the editor at the
time, continued to collect material and even circulated some of it to members in
the original spirit of a correspondence society. At the end of the war the Naval
Review began publication again, including the material Henderson had collected,
to ensure there wasn’t a loss of lessons learned from the conflict.12
When publication began again in 1919, Henderson’s opening article specifically took inspiration from the U.S. Naval Institute but looked to take a uniquely
British tack. Concerns that expressing contrarian views would have a negative
impact on the careers of junior officers, who were the target audience, led to a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/10
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unique editorial policy. Where Proceedings has a clear editorial requirement for
authors to write under their own names, and the Naval Magazine encouraged the
use of pseudonyms, the Naval Review elected not to use bylines at all. Articles
were considered “from the membership,” and the editors diligently protected the
contributors.13
The no-name policy had a secondary impact. Senior officers or establishment supporters could write counterarguments without standing on their rank.
Genuine debates about naval subjects were fostered through the process. Over
the course of time the publication, which is still active and vibrant today, has
gone through cycles of official approval as well as censure from the Admiralty.
In World War II there was no censorship, and the “Diary of the War at Sea” published in the journal’s pages has become an important historical record. Today,
the Naval Review has adjusted its editorial policy to allow both pseudonyms and
real names, increasing flexibility for writers and editors while maintaining the
ability to protect new thinkers. Like Proceedings in the United States, it has become the central place for discussions of naval affairs and constructive criticism
from inside the naval sphere.14
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY YOUNG TURKS
At the start of the twentieth century a cadre of revolutionaries in Ottoman Turkey
was first described with the label the Young Turks. Across the past hundred years
the label came to mean a new breed or a young advocate for change. American
politicians in the 1920s and beyond have described the junior officers who drove
debate and writing in the pages of the Naval Magazine, Proceedings, and the
Naval Review as Young Turks. Today, the members and leaders of DEF follow in
the wake of these previous reformers and idealists. The ease of access to publishing created by digital and social media has led to a growing proliferation of new
groups looking to foster ideas and critical debate. Examples include think-tank
Internet forums like the Center for International Maritime Security (based in
Washington, D.C.); blogs focused on strategy, policy, and leadership, such as the
Bridge (also known as the Strategy Bridge on Facebook and Twitter) and War
Council; and more formal web-based publications like War on the Rocks.
These new organizations should look to the history of reform-minded socie
ties of the past to help chart their way. The career dangers from a military culture
that remains conservative and slow to change are still real for internal critics,
despite historical examples of successful reformers. Many senior officers still appear to ascribe to Admiral Arleigh Burke’s invective that “dissent is not a virtue.”
Because of this, questions of attribution and clearly stated publication policies are
important for the new Young Turks to consider. The longevity of Proceedings and
the Naval Review offers both examples and warnings about balancing new ideas
and criticism with explanations and defense of established policies.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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It is inspiring to see those who are interested in looking at their military service, or employment in the defense world, with a critical eye. The field of critical
military studies sometimes focuses on the work of academic, political, or civilianinterest groups to reform our military forces and defense industries from the
outside. These groups can occasionally be seen as antagonistic toward those who
wear uniforms, or even dismissive of them. However, criticism and dissent from
within the armed forces are important drivers of change and adaptation. Publications, formerly in print but now commonly online, where these thinkers express
themselves remain a vital outlet not only for forwarding modern debate and innovation but also for studying the past successes and failures of military criticism.
Finding organizations that, like DEF, aim to bring civilian and uniformed critics together to think of new ideas and harvest solutions will be an important part
of progress in the twenty-first century.
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